Using three di¤erent panel data sets, we show: (i) that mark-ups are signi…cantly higher in South African manufacturing industries than they are in corresponding industries worldwide; (ii) that competition policy (i.e a reduction of mark-ups) should have largely positive e¤ects on productivity growth in South Africa.
Introduction
Recent empirical studies (e.g Nickell (1996) , Blundell et al (1999) , Aghion et al (2005) ), have pointed to a positive e¤ect of product market competition on productivity growth, particularly at low levels of competition. In this paper we explore three di¤erent data sets to: (i) …rst, compare product market competition in South African manufacturing …rms and sectors to that in the corresponding sectors worldwide; (ii) second, assess the e¤ect on productivity growth in South Africa of increasing product market competition.
The three data sets are respectively: (i) industry-level panel data for SA and more than 100 countries since the mid-1960s, from UNIDO; (ii) industry-level panel data over the period 1970-2004 from the TIPS database; (iii) …rm-level panel data since the early 1980's from publicly listed companies. Product market competition is measured by two alternative formulations of the mark-up of price over the marginal cost of production. Productivity growth is computed either as the growth rate of real local currency value added per worker, or as TFP growth.
Our main …ndings can be summarized as follows: (a) consistently over the three data sets, mark-ups are signi…cantly higher in South African industries than they are in corresponding industries worldwide. For instance, pro…tability margins as computed from the listed …rms sample, are more than twice as large in South Africa than in other countries on average. Moreover, there is no declining trend in the mark-up di¤erential between SA and other countries over the most recent period; (b) higher past mark ups are associated with lower current productivity growth rates. In particular, a ten percent reduction in SA mark-ups would increase productivity growth in SA by 2 to 2.5% per year; (c) …nally, when introducing a quadratic term on the RHS of our growth regression, we …nd the same kind of inverted-U relationship between competition and growth as for the UK and other countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model to analyze the relationship between competition and growth, and to describe the "escape competition"e¤ect that underlies the positive correlation between competition and growth. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology, the three data sets and the measures used in our regressions. Section 4 shows the mark-up comparisons. Section 5 presents our growth regressions. Finally, Section 6 provides some conclusions and suggested avenues for further work.
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Competition and Productivity Growth in South Africa 2 2. Theory: the escape competition e¤ect We consider a domestic economy which takes as given the rate of innovation in the rest of the world.
1 Thus the world technology frontier is also moving at a constant rate, with productivity A t at the end of period t, satisfying:
where > 1:
In each country, the …nal good is produced with a continuum of intermediate inputs and we normalize the labor supply at L = 1; so that:
where, in each sector i, only one …rm produces intermediate input i using the …nal good as capital according to a one-for-one technology.
In each sector, the incumbent …rm faces a competitive fringe of …rms that can produce the same kind of intermediate good, although at a higher unit cost. More speci…cally, we assume that at the end of period t; at unit cost ; where we assume 1 < < 1= < ; a competitive fringe of …rms can produce one unit of intermediate input i of a quality equal to min(A it ; A t 1 ); where A it is the productivity level achieved in sector i after innovation has had the opportunity to occur in sector i within period t:
In each period t; there are three types of sectors, which we refer to as type-j sectors, with j 2 f0; 1; 2g: A type-j sector starts up at the beginning of period t with productivity A it 1 = A t 1 j ; that is, j steps behind the current frontier A t 1 . The pro…t ‡ow of an incumbent …rm in any sector at the end of period t; will depend upon the technological position of that …rm with regard to the technological frontier at the end of the period.
Between the beginning and the end of the current period t; the incumbent …rm in any sector i has the possibility of innovating with positive probability. Innovations occur step-bystep: in any sector an innovation moves productivity upward by the same factor : Incumbent …rms can a¤ect the probability of an innovation by investing more in R&D at the beginning of the period. Namely, by investing the quadratic R&D e¤ort 1 2
A it 1 2 an incumbent …rm i in a type-0 or type-1 sector, innovates with probability : However, innovation is assumed to be automatic in type-2sectors, which in turn re ‡ects a knowledge externality from more advanced sectors which limits the maximum distance of any sector to the technological frontier. Now, consider the R&D incentives of incumbent …rms in the di¤erent types of sectors at the beginning of period t: Firms in type-2 sectors have no incentive to invest in R&D since innovation is automatic in such sectors. Thus where j is the equilibrium R&D choice in sector j:
Firms in type-1 sectors, that start one step behind the current frontier at A it 1 = A t 2 at the beginning of period t; end up with productivity A t = A t 1 if they successfully innovate, and with productivity A t = A t 2 otherwise. In either case, the competitive fringe can produce intermediate goods of the same quality but at cost instead of 1, which in turn, as in section 2 above, the equilibrium pro…t is equal to t = A t ( ); Thus the net rent from innovating for a type-1 …rm is equal to
and therefore a type-1 …rm will choose its R&D e¤ort to solve:
max f(A t 1 A t 2 ) ( ) 1 2 A t 2 2 g; which yields 1 = (1 1 ) ( ):
In particular an increase in product market competition, measured as an reduction in the unit cost of the competitive fringe, will reduce the innovation incentives of a type-1 …rm. This we refer to as the Schumpeterian e¤ect of product market competition: competition reduces innovation incentives and therefore productivity growth by reducing the rents from innovations of type-1 …rms that start below the technological frontier. This is the dominant e¤ect, both in IO models of product di¤erentiation and entry, and in basic endogenous growth models. Note that type-1 …rms cannot escape the fringe by innovating: whether they innovate or not, these …rms face competitors that can produce the same quality as theirs at cost : As we shall now see, things become di¤erent in the case of type-0 …rms.
2 This, in turn, follows immediately from the fact that
which in turn implies that in equilibrium
We then simply substitute for x it in the expression for pro…t t ; namely t = (p it 1)x it = ( 1)( )
.
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Firms in type-0 sectors, that start at the current frontier, end up with productivity A t if they innovate, and stay with their initial productivity A t 1 if they do not. But the competitive fringe can never get beyond producing quality A t 1 : Thus, by innovating, a type-0 incumbent …rm produces an intermediate good which is times better than the competing good the fringe could produce, and at unit cost 1 instead of for the fringe. Our assumption 1 < then implies that competition by the fringe is no longer a binding constraint for an innovating incumbent, so that its equilibrium pro…t post-innovation, will simply be the pro…t of an unconstrained monopolist, namely:
On the other hand, a type-0 …rm that does not innovate, will keep its productivity equal to A t 1 : Since the competitive fringe can produce up to this quality level at cost ; the equilibrium pro…t of a type-0 …rm that does not innovate, is equal to
A type-0 …rm will then choose its R&D e¤ort to:
so that in equilibrium
In particular an increase in product market competition, i.e a reduction in ; will now have a fostering e¤ect on R&D and innovation. This, we refer to as the escape competition e¤ect: competition reduces pre-innovation rents of type-0 incumbent …rms, but not their post-innovation rents since by innovating these …rms have escaped the fringe. This, in turn. induces those …rms to innovate in order to escape competition with the fringe. The combination of these two e¤ects explains the inverted-U relationship between competition and growth which we observe in most countries. However, if we just look for a linear relationship between productivity growth and product market competition, we generally …nd that the escape competition e¤ect dominates. Both …ndings are con…rmed when restricting attention to SA industry-or …rm-level panel data as we shall see in the next sections.
3. Empirical methodology, data, and measurement 3.1. Productivity growth, pricing power and mark-ups Our interest lies in the link between productivity growth and competitive pressure in industries. We proceed by the estimation of the general empirical speci…cation given by:
(1)
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where P growth it denotes a measure of productivity growth in sector i at time t, P CM it is a measure of competitive pressure in sector i; and I i and I t stand for industry and year …xed e¤ects. Two empirical measures for productivity growth are employed in the analysis: labour productivity growth, as well as total factor productivity growth as given by the Solow residual.
The extent of competitive pressure in an industry is proxied by the pricing power evident in the industry. We pay attention to the possibility of alternative measures of pricing power, as well as the existence of a literature devoted to the estimation of the precise magnitude of the mark-up. Thus we follow Aghion et al (2005) in computing the extent of pricing power in an industry directly, by means of a proxy of the Lerner index. The study employs two proxies of the Lerner index, one given by the di¤erential between value added and the total wage bill as a proportion of gross output:
the second as the di¤erence between output and both wage and capital costs as a proportion of output:
where pY denotes nominal GDP, w the nominal wage rate, L the number of workers, r denotes the nominal interest rate less in ‡ation plus the sectoral depreciation rate of capital, and K the nominal capital stock. In addition, following the contributions by Hall (1990) and Roeger (1995) we also estimate the magnitude of the mark-up by means of:
where = P=M C, with P denoting price, and M C denoting marginal cost. Under perfect competition = 1, while imperfectly competitive markets allow > 1. denotes the di¤erence operator, lower case denotes the natural log transform, q, l, and k denote real value-added, labour, and capital inputs, and is the labour share in value-added. Details on methodological issues surrounding the estimation of mark-ups are provided in an Appendix -see section 7. below.
Finally, for …rm level data we also add a range of measures of pro…tability.
Data
This study employs three distinct sources of data. Confronted with gaps in …rm-level data over the past ten years, we use:
1. Industry-level panel data for South Africa and for more than 100 countries since the mid 1960s, obtained from UNIDO's International Industry Statistics 2004. This dataset contains yearly information on output, value added, total wages, and employment for 27 di¤erent manufacturing industries in more than 100 countries since the mid 1960s. From these data we compute price-cost margins by means of equation (2). Real labor productivity growth is measured as the growth rate of real local currency value added per worker.
2. Firm-level (Worldscope) evidence from publicly listed companies. The …rm-level evidence is based on Worldscope data for publicly-listed companies in 56 di¤erent countries since the early 1980s. The dataset contains yearly balance sheet and P&L items, and other basic …rm characteristics. Margins are computed by means of equation (2), and real labor productivity growth as the growth rate of real local currency sales per worker. The …rm-level data are truncated at the 5% level in order to avoid the results being driven by a few outliers. One may question our use of two alternative industry-level panel data sets, namely UNIDO and TIPS. However, they o¤er alternative advantages: the former covers a larger number of countries; the latter provides more detailed data series on South Africa.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. There are questions over the reliability of industry data post-1996. Since the last South African manufacturing survey was undertaken in 1996, data post-1996 have been disaggregated from the 2-digit sector level on the basis of a single input-output table. The large sample manufacturing survey of 2001 does not appear to have been incorporated into the data, and moreover the 2001 survey has not released the labour component of the survey. The reliability of the data has su¤ered as a result of this data collection strategy. This is evident from the evidence presented in Table 2 , which reports standard deviations of the computed mark-ups for this study. We report only the standard deviations for computed mark-ups, since the measure summarizes the output, capital and labour dimensions in the manufacturing sector. Standard deviations increase substantially post-1996 for all sectors, and increase even more markedly after 2000. In the instance of some sectors (eg. Rubber products), the increase is of very substantial magnitude. This re ‡ects increased volatility in the underlying series from which the mark-ups are computed.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. In interpreting the results that follow, it must be borne in mind that reliability of all results based on industry data are likely to decline substantially after 1996. There is no adequate means of compensating for the absence of data collection for the manufacturing sector, and after having collected manufacturing censuses on a biannual basis since 1917, South Africa simply ceased doing do since 1996.
Higher mark-ups in South Africa
The objective of this section is to explore the intensity of competition in South African manufacturing industry. We …nd consistent evidence of pricing power in South African industry that is greater than international comparators, and which is non-declining over time. In this our results are consistent with those reported in Fedderke, Kularatne and Mariotti (2007) . Results prove to be robust across:
Three distinct data sets, covering both industry level data as well as …rm-level evidence.
Two proxies of the Lerner index, given either by the di¤erential between value added and the total wage bill as a proportion of output, or the di¤erence between output and both wage and capital costs as a proportion of output.
Alternative measures of …rm pro…tability.
The measure of mark-up of price over marginal cost of production as suggested by section 3.
The level of aggregation for industry, or …rm size.
The Industry-level (UNIDO) panel data for South Africa
We compute price-cost margins as given by equation (2), while real labor productivity growth is measured as the growth rate of real local currency value added per worker. Table 3 presents the measures of competition and productivity for each manufacturing industry in South Africa. Due to data availability the price-cost margins we compute di¤er in two major respects from the Lerner index traditionally used to gauge the degree of competition: the fact that we use average instead of marginal costs, and that we do not take into account the payment to physical capital. The price-cost margins of Table 3 suggest that there is no signi…cant time variation in the magnitude of the computed mark-up for South African manufacturing industries.
Firm-level (Worldscope) evidence from publicly listed companies
In order to explore the degree of competition in South Africa we analyze …rm-level data corresponding to listed …rms in 60 countries in the period 1980-2004. We investigate a number of indicators of pro…tability across industries and over time. In order to make the analysis robust to in ‡uential outliers we truncate all the variables at the 5% level and report the median.
Results are reported in Table 4 Table 4 . These patterns do not show systematic variation in time -see the results of Table 5 . These di¤erences are in general statistically signi…cant and robust to controlling for total and per capita GDP.
In Table 6 we report separately the median net income over sales ratio for those …rms that have a size (based on sales) above and below the median within each industry-country-year cluster. In most sectors there is no signi…cant di¤erence between large and small …rms either in South Africa or in the world as a whole -see the results reported in Table 6 . There is thus no evidence that large …rms in South Africa are relatively more pro…table than small ones, at least in the corporate sector: though there is some evidence that in the most recent period large …rms have switched from being less (10% lower), to more (50% higher) pro…table than small …rms -see Table 6 .
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE. Finally, we compare the aggregate industry price-cost margins in the manufacturing sector, as computed for the UNESCO industry data base with that of the listed …rms in the Worldscope data set. Price-cost margin is de…ned as value added over output for the industry aggregates and as operating income over sales for listed …rms. Results are reported in Table 7 . The ratio between the margins for listed …rms and all …rms is about twice as large in South Africa as in the world as a whole. The di¤erence is observed across virtually all the sectors, although is especially large in Tobacco, Furniture and Electric Machinery.
Solow residuals are a noisy measure of markups (capturing all errors in the measurement of labor and capital), but primarily because the measure cannot be readily computed for a large number of countries, …rms, industries, and years. Indeed, in the UNIDO database we do not have su¢ cient investment data for South African industries to be able to compute the capital stock.
Industry-level panel data results from the TIPS database
In this section we explore both average manufacturing industry mark-ups, as well as industry level mark-ups in terms of the methodology outlined by section 3. 4 For the average manufacturing sector mark-up we employ the pooled mean group dynamic heterogeneous panel estimation methodology of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) , 5 thus controlling for both industry e¤ects and dynamic adjustment to equilibrium over time. For individual sectors, estimation is by means of the cointegration-consistent ARDL methodology of section 8.0.2..
In Table 8 we report the PMGE results for the manufacturing sectors given by the speci…cation:
with it denoting the share of labour in value-added of sector i, (w + l) it the log change in nominal labour cost for sector i, (r + k) it the log change in total capital stock for sector i, and N SR it the nominal Solow residual. 1 now measures ( 1), where = P=M C is the mark-up.
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INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE. Results are for the average manufacturing sector mark-up, both over the full sample period, as well as rolling decade-long sub-periods, estimated from the TIPS panel data set. Estimations indicate the presence of an aggregate mark-up for the manufacturing sector over the full sample period of 54%. The error-correction term (the -parameter), indicates that adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is rapid. The Hausman test statistic accepts the inference of an homogenous mark-up across all manufacturing sectors for the long run speci…cation.
The declining trend in the aggregate manufacturing sector mark-up reported by Edwards and Van De Winkel (2005) does not prove to be robust in our estimates -and appears to be driven largely by the relatively low estimate that emerges for the 1991-2000 sub-sample period. Both prior, and subsequent sample periods report higher mark-ups, suggesting that evidence of declining pricing power in the South African economy is not robust. More plausible is that the evidence is of a stable and non-declining level of pricing power, consistent with the …rm-level evidence reported in section 4.2.
allowing for ready computation of the mark-up. Given the noise, and other systematic components of the Solow residual, the series requires smoothing. We employed both moving average and Hodrick-Prescott …lter smoothing, and split the full sample period into several overlapping ten-year sub-periods and calculate the average computed mark-up for each sub-period as a moving average. The general trend structure to emerge is broadly consistent with that reported for the estimated results, though they prove subject to greater volatility. 5 See also the discussion in Fedderke (2004) . The Estimation Methodology Appendix (section 8.) provides the detail.
6 See the discussion in section 7. for the derivation of this speci…cation.
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE. For the sectoral evidence, we note that regressors are almost without exception stationary. Table 9 reports relevant ADF test statistics. ARDL remains an appropriate estimation strategy (with e¢ ciency gains over OLS in the presence of dynamics). In Table 10 we report the individually estimated three digit manufacturing sector mark-up estimates obtained from the PSS ARDL cointegration estimations.
7 Again, estimated mark-ups are reported both for the full sample period, as well as for rolling decade-long sub-periods.
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE. The mark-up is consistently statistically signi…cant across all 3-digit manufacturing sectors.
8 Consistent with the aggregate evidence for the average mark-up in the manufacturing sector as a whole, the evidence suggests that mark-ups in manufacturing industry have increased rather than decreased toward the end of the sample period. In Table 11 we summarize by placing sectors into six main categories: high mark-ups that either decline, rise or stay the same into the last within-sample decade (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) ; or low mark-ups that either decline, rise or stay the same into the last within-sample decade (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . We …nd that for 16 sectors the mark-up increases, for seven it declines, while for four sectors there is little change.
INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE. As a …nal consistency check of our results, given the potential for high volatility in the Solow residual, we computed the alternative measure of pricing power provided by the proxy for the Lerner index given by equation (3). Results are reported by three digit manufacturing sector, and by ten year sample sub-period in Table 12 . Consistent with the remainder of the results reported thus far, the results consistently indicate a non-declining pricing power in South African manufacturing industry.
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INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE.
Market competition and productivity growth in SA
The objective of this section is to explore the impact of the intensity of competition on productivity growth in the South African manufacturing sector. We …nd that pricing power in South African industry is associated with lower productivity growth in South African manufacturing. Results prove to be robust across:
Competition and growth, using the industry-level (UNIDO) and …rm-level (Worldscope) panel data
We deal with the di¤erence between average and marginal costs by estimating the relationship between growth and margins using the time variation in margins within each industry or sector. We estimate equation (1) such that:
such that P growth it is given by average labor productivity growth in sector i at time t, P CM it 1 is the lagged average mark-up in sector i; as computed in equation (2).
We present results for the world as a whole as well as South Africa speci…cally. In the world regressions we add country …xed e¤ects. The observations are not assumed to be independent within each country and year, so that we compute signi…cance levels using errors that are clustered at the country and year level. If competition spurs innovation and growth, we would expect a negative coe¢ cient for PCM.
This speci…cation allows us to shield the results from either industry or …rm characteristics that may a¤ect measured price-cost margins but that are nonetheless not related to the degree of competition it faces. One such characteristic is the fact that the divergence between marginal and average costs may di¤er across industries due to di¤erential economies of scale. Another possibility is that the exclusion of …nancial costs from the PCM measure may have a di¤erential e¤ect across industries sorted on capital intensity. If for some reason labor productivity growth is correlated with these characteristics, estimation using cross-industry data will su¤er from omitted variable bias. However, as long as these characteristics do not vary systematically in time, the approach we propose solves the issue. We also run …rm-level regressions not controlling for …rm …xed e¤ects but only for industry …xed e¤ects. In this case part of the variation comes from the di¤erence of PCMs across …rms and not only in time within …rms.
Tables 13 and 14 present the basic results using industry and …rm-level data, respectively. In the …rst and fourth columns of Table 13 we use aggregates for the entire manufacturing sector. In the rest of the columns we use the variation of the 27 di¤erent manufacturing industries. Columns 1 through 3 correspond to the estimation over the data for the full set of 115 countries in the UNIDO data set, while the rest use data for South Africa alone.
INSERT TABLES 13 AND 14 ABOUT HERE. The results strongly suggest that there is a positive e¤ect of product market competition on productivity growth. All the coe¢ cients for margins are negative and statistically signi…cant at conventional values. The economic magnitude of the e¤ect is also very large. A 10% increase from the mean margin of 0.24 on the 115-country sample implies a decrease in productivity growth of 2.4% per year. For the typical industry this would mean reducing growth from 2.6% a year to a mere 0.2%. A similar change on margins in South Africa is associated with a decline of 1.6% per year, which would reduce the median growth from 1% to -0.6%.
Figures 1 and 2 depict graphically the relationship between margins and productivity found in the aggregate and the industry-level data. It is clear from these that the relationship is not driven by in ‡uential outliers but is a robust pattern in the data. INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE. Table 14 presents results with …rm (columns 1 through 3 and 7 through 9) and industry …xed e¤ects (the rest of the columns) for a sample of 56 countries (left panel) and South Africa alone (right panel). As in the industry data, the coe¢ cient for the PCM term is in all cases negative and signi…cant in statistical terms, both on average across countries and in South Africa in particular. The economic magnitude of the e¤ect is somewhat larger that what we found in the industry data. Here a 10% increase in margins (over the mean of 0.11 for the 56-country sample and 0.12 for South Africa) is associated with a decrease in productivity growth of 3.3% in the 56-country sample and 2.4% in South Africa. Again, these magnitudes are substantial since the median productivity growth rate is 1.2% and 1.8% in each sample.
The results are virtually unchanged when we include …nancial costs into our cost measure (see columns 2, 5, 8, and 11).
Interestingly, the relationship between margins and productivity although negative on average, is U-shaped. These results are in line with Aghion et al (2005) ´s theoretical predictions and extend their results for British publicly-listed …rms.
INSERT TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE. Even if we use lagged margins and control for industry and year …xed e¤ects, the results above may still be due to spurious correlation. In particular, our computed margins may be caused to some extent by shocks to productivity growth. We attempt to control for this endogeneity by instrumenting margins with industry import penetration, which is assumed to a¤ect productivity only through their e¤ect on product market competition. Import penetration is computed for each industry, country, year observation as total imports over output. The raw data are taken from Mayer and Zignano (2005) . Table 15 shows that import penetration is not a particularly good instrument for margins in the sense that its correlation with margins is typically not signi…cantly negative.
10 Not surprisingly, then, the secondstage IV estimates of the e¤ect of margins on productivity growth are also typically not signi…cantly negative. However, where import penetration appears to be a good instrument (…rm-level, all countries sample in column three) the IV estimate of the e¤ect of marginsalthough smaller than before -enters negatively and statistically signi…cantly into the growth regression. This suggests that at least part of the relation between margins and growth is caused by margins a¤ecting growth and not the other way around.
We experimented with some other instruments such as the opening of the economy to trade, the degree of tradeability of the industry, and the level of tari¤s. In each case the results were similar to those reported in Table 15 . The instruments are not particularly good, and the IV estimate of the coe¢ cient of margins on growth typically enters negatively but not signi…cantly so.
Competition, growth and employment using the industry-level panel data from the TIPS database
As a …nal exploration of the impact of price-cost margins on productivity growth, we employ the South African data base provided by TIPS. One advantage of the data base lies in the long sample time-frame for which it is available, allowing us to test for the robustness of results in the presence of both dynamics and industry heterogeneity. In addition, the more comprehensive data series available in the data base allow for a more accurate computation of price-cost margins.
Given the discussion of section 3.1., we estimate equation (1) such that:
where P growth it 1 is the Solow residual in sector i at time t, P CM 2 is the proxy for the Lerner index as given by equation (3), and I i ; I t stand for industry and time …xed e¤ects. As discussed in the preceding section, inclusion of industry and time …xed e¤ects again allows us to shield results from either industry characteristics that may a¤ect measured price-cost margins but that are nonetheless not related to the degree of competition in the sector. INSERT TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE.  Table 16 reports results for the manufacturing industry average over the full 1970-2004 sample period, controlling either for industry …xed e¤ects (columns 1 and 3) or both industry and time …xed e¤ects (columns 2 and 4), and allowing for either a linear (columns 1 and 2) or non-linear (columns 3 and 4) impact of our Lerner index proxy on productivity growth. Results consistently con…rm a negative impact of the price-cost margin on productivity growth, regardless of the presence of time e¤ects, or the non-linearity in the price-cost margin -though statistical signi…cance dissipates in the presence of both time dummies and controlling for the non-linearity in the measure for pricing power.
In the estimation results reported thus far we have controlled for group heterogeneity only by means of group and time …xed e¤ects -ignoring the possibility of group heterogeneity in parameter space. Yet failure to control for group heterogeneity results in bias and inconsistency of parameter estimates -see Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) . In the present set of estimations we therefore also allow for the possibility of heterogeneity across industry sectors in parameter estimates. Details of the dynamic heterogeneous panel (pooled mean group) estimator employed is given in Appendix 8.0.1.. Results for the full sample period are reported in columns (5) through (8) of Table 16 . We estimate controlling both for linear (columns 5 and 7) and non-linear (columns 6 and 8) impacts of pricing power on productivity growth. In addition, since there is some doubt on data quality for a number of the industrial sectors, 11 we estimate both for the full industrial sample with 28 sectors (columns 5 and 6), and for a sub-set of 22 sectors which excludes sectors with doubtful data quality. For the PMGE estimates, the Hausman test statistic con…rms the inference of an homogenous mark-up across all manufacturing sectors for the long run speci…cation, though short run dynamics vary across the industrial sectors. Moreover, the error-correction term (the ECM -parameter), indicates that adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is rapid. Results are thus statistically coherent.
Again, PMGE estimations con…rm the presence of a negative impact of the measure of the price-cost margin on productivity growth, for both the full industrial sample as well as the sub-sample of industries, and irrespective of whether the non-linearity in the price-cost margin is controlled for.
For the full 1970-2004 sample period for South Africa, we thus consistently and robustly …nd that the proxy for the Lerner index of equation (3) is negatively associated with productivity growth as measured by TFP growth. Moreover, the impact is both statistically and economically signi…cant. An estimated coe¢ cient of 0:10 for the price cost-margin means that on average across all manufacturing sectors, a 0:1 unit increase in the Lerner index proxy, is associated with a 1% reduction in the real growth rate as measured by growth in total factor productivity.
Evidence from the detailed South African speci…c data set is thus consistent with the international data sets considered by in the preceding section. The only divergence is with respect to the inverted-U relationship which …nds no support from the full sample period results presented in Table 16 . Neither the inverted-U speci…cation, nor the statistical significance of the non-linearity are supported by the results.
To control for the potential endogeneity arising from the fact that our computed margins may be caused to some extent by shocks to productivity growth, we instrument on a range of trade-related measures obtained from Edwards (2005) . Speci…cally, we employ computed e¤ective rates of protection, scheduled tari¤ rates, export taxes and a measure of the antiexport bias of trade protection, in each instance by SIC 3-digit manufacturing sector, as instruments. Since these series are available only for the 1988-2003 period, the size of the South African panel is correspondingly reduced in dimension.
In Table 17 we report results that replicate those of Table 16 , to con…rm the robustness of our …ndings for the 1988-2003 sub-sample. Within group estimation results are reported in columns 1 through 4, and PMGE results in columns 5 through 8. 12 Results over the most recent period con…rm the negative impact of the price-cost margin measure on productivity growth -indeed the magnitude of the impact approximately doubles in magnitude. In addition, the inverted-U relationship that was not able to be isolated for the full sample period, is now consistently con…rmed by our estimations, with strong statistical signi…cance. Results are robust to controlling for industry and time e¤ects, and further strengthen once we control for the possibility of parameter heterogeneity across industrial sectors by means of the PMG estimator.
INSERT TABLE 17 ABOUT HERE. Finally, estimation results for the 1988-2003 sub-sample, in which the Lerner index proxy is instrumented on the tade protection measures detailed above, are reported in Table 18 .
INSERT TABLE 18 ABOUT HERE.
As for the previous section, our instruments are of limited quality. While demonstrating a low correlation with our measure of productivity growth, only scheduled tari¤ rates and export taxes show statistically signi…cant partial correlations with the Lerner index measure, and the absolute magnitude of the correlation of all of the trade protection measures with the price-cost margin measure is low. Unsurprisingly, therefore, under within group estimation employing the instrumented measure of pricing power, the impact of the price-cost margin is generally negative, but statistically insigni…cant -see columns 1 through 4 of Table 18 . On the other hand, where we control for industry heterogeneity by means of the PMG estimator, the negative impact of the instrumented price cost margin on productivity growth is not only statistically signi…cant, but strengthens in economic magnitude relative to that found for the estimates that do not control for endogeneity. Finally, for the PMG estimations, the inverted-U relationship …nds further statistical con…rmation.
Despite the fact that we have available only relatively por instruments, therefore, these results suggest that the relation between price-cost margins and growth is caused by margins a¤ecting growth, not the other way around. 
Labour ‡exibility
As a …nal empirical contribution in this paper, we explore the link between industry mark-ups and the ‡exibility of labour markets.
The theory relating productivity residuals to the mark-up is based on a …rst-order Taylor approximation (in logs) of the primal and dual Solow residuals. This is appropriate when estimating the steady-state mark-up. However it does not allow for the investigation of cyclical e¤ects which are second-order. An adaptation of a result derived by Oliviera Martins and Scarpetta (1999) shows us that under the condition of a two-input production function (we ignore intermediate inputs) and with Hicks neutrality in technical progress, the equation for the variable mark-up is given by:
where denotes the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, the steady-state mark-up and L the amount of labour devoted to …xed costs. The
term, representing the ratio of labour employed to the proportion of total labour employed which is variable, can be interpreted as an indicator of the degree of downward 13 We also explored the impact of competitive pressure on employment by means of:
where L it denotes employment in sector i at time t, and P CM 2 is the proxy for the Lerner index as given by equation (3). We …nd a statistically signi…cant though small negative impact of the price-cost margin on employment both for manufacturing industry as a whole, and for individual industries. Results available from the authors on request. rigidities in adjustments of labour time. The feasible range is from unity (no rigidity) to in…nity (complete rigidity).
Rearrangement of (7) provides the following expression:
which leads to the speci…cation that is estimated and discussed below. In order to econometrically investigate the relationship between the mark-up and labour adjustment, equation (8) suggests a speci…cation of the form:
where
under the notation standard to this paper. Two of the required variables are not available directly from the original panel data set: the steady-state mark-up and the growth rate of the mark-up. We use the mark-up that was estimated over the full sample period under the Hall-Roeger methodology in section 4.3. as the steady-state mark-up for each sector, and use the smoothed computed mark-up series to calculate the growth rate of the mark-up for each sector.
A simple manipulation of coe¢ cient estimates allows us to obtain an estimate of the labour ‡exibility coe¢ cient,
. We use c 1 to obtain an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour as in equation (10). Then we use c 2 along with the estimate of the elasticity of substitution to obtain an estimate of the labour adjustment coe¢ cient as in equation (11).
Under circumstances in which c 1 is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, we infer an elasticity of substitution of unity in the calculation of the labour adjustment coe¢ cient as this follows directly from c 1 = 0. Note that when we calculate the labour adjustment coe¢ cient, the "correct" elasticity of substitution is de…ned to be b as in (11) 
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INSERT TABLE 18 ABOUT HERE. We report the PMGE results for the manufacturing sector in Table 18 . The errorcorrection term, the -parameter, indicates that adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is rapid, and increasing with an increase in the adopted lag structure. The Hausman test accepts the inference of an homogenous labour adjustment coe¢ cient across sectors for the long run.
Results indicate an estimate of an aggregate labour adjustment coe¢ cient for the manufacturing sector over the full sample period of between 2.84 and 3.43, depending on which lag structure is adopted. This would suggest that of the total labour employed in manufacturing in South Africa, two-thirds is e¤ectively allocated to …xed costs and only one-third is attributable to variable costs.
In order to investigate the trend of the aggregate manufacturing sector labour adjustment coe¢ cient over time, we run the estimation of our speci…cation on …fteen-year sub-periods and roll these through the full sample period year-by-year. The results are reported in Table  19 . The general pattern that emerges is a decreasing labour adjustment coe¢ cient through the …rst half of the sample followed by an increasing labour ‡exibility coe¢ cient in the second half of the sample.
INSERT TABLE 19 ABOUT HERE. The inference is thus of increasing ‡exibility in the adjustment of labour time in the …rst half of the sample, which is substantially reversed in the second half of the sample period.
Conclusion
In this paper we have explored three alternative panel data sets to …rst assess the degree of product market competition in South African manufacturing industries, and then to estimate the e¤ect of product market competition on growth. Consistently across the three data set, we found that: (i) mark-ups remain signi…cantly higher in SA industries than in corresponding industries worldwide; (ii) that a reduction in mark-ups (that is, an increase in product market competition) should have large positive e¤ects on productivity growth in South Africa.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in several interesting directions. A …rst extension is to push further on the search for good instruments for product market competition. A second extension is to look for entry data and perform the same kind of comparative analysis of entry measures and regression analysis of entry and growth as we did for mark-ups in this paper. A third extension would be to explore the link between trade liberalization and its impact on competitive pressure, hence productivity growth in more detail. These and other extensions of the paper await further research.
Estimation of Mark-ups Methodology Appendix
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the primal computation of the Solow Residual (SR), or growth in Total Factor Productivity (T F P ), is related to the mark-up of prices over marginal cost. Hall (1990) demonstrates that:
where = P=M C, with P denoting price, and M C denoting marginal cost. Under perfect competition = 1, while imperfectly competitive markets allow > 1. denotes the di¤erence operator, lower case denotes the natural log transform, q, l, and k denote real valueadded, labour, and capital inputs, is the labour share in value-added, and = A=A denotes exogenous (Hicks-neutral) technological progress, where is A is the technology parameter.
Estimation of equation (12) faces the di¢ culty that the explanatory variables ( l k) will themselves be correlated with the productivity shocks , and hence result in bias and inconsistency in estimates of . One solution is to instrument.
14 Unfortunately instrumentation for the US has led to the estimation of mark-ups that are generally implausibly high.
An alternative approach to avoid the endogeneity bias and instrumentation problems has been suggested by Roeger (1995) . By computing the dual of the Solow Residual (DSR), we can again obtain a relation of the price-based productivity measure to the mark-up:
with w; r denoting the natural logs of the wage rate and rental price of capital respectively. While equation (13) is subject to the same endogeneity problems and hence instrumentation problems as equation (12), Roeger's insight was that subtraction of equation (13) from equation (12) would give us the nominal Solow residual (N SR), given by:
in which the productivity shocks ( ) have cancelled out, removing the endogeneity problem, and hence the need for instrumentation. The mark-up is now accessible either to simple OLS estimation, or to direct computation. Extensions of the framework for identifying the extent of mark-up pricing provided by equation (14), include relaxing the assumption of constant returns to scale, incorporating the impact of business cycles, import and export competition, market structure, and the use of alternative measures of output. Any estimate of mark-up that follows from Solow Residuals should be interpreted as lower-bound values if increasing returns to scale are present. 15 Since tari¤ and other restrictions clearly carry implications for the degree of international competition to which domestic industry is exposed, and hence the magnitude of the feasible mark-up that domestic industry can maintain, import and export competition is relevant to the pricing power of industry. 16 Market structure similarly carries implications for competitive pressure and hence pricing behaviour in markets. Consider the unrestricted error correction ARDL(p; q) representation:
where i = 1; 2; :::; N; t = 1; 2; :::; T , denote the cross section units and time periods respectively. Here y it is a scalar dependent variable, x it (k 1) a vector of (weakly exogenous) regressors for group i, and i represents …xed e¤ects. Allow the disturbances " it 's to be independently distributed across i and t, with zero means and variances 2 i > 0, and assume that i < 0 for all i. Then there exists a long-run relationship between y it and x it : y it = 0 i x it + it ; i = 1; 2; :::; N; t = 1; 2; :::; T;
where i = 0 i = i is the k 1 vector of the long-run coe¢ cients, and it 's are stationary with possibly non-zero means (including …xed e¤ects). This allows equation (15) to be written as:
where i;t 1 is the error correction term given by equation (16), and thus i is the error correction coe¢ cient measuring the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.
15 Speci…cally, one can show that where the assumption of constant returns to scale is dropped, equation (14) is actually:
where > 1 denotes increasing returns to scale. E¤ectively equation (14) assumes = 1. See Oliviera Martins and Scarpetta (1999) . 16 See the discussion in Hakura (1998) , and the extensions and empirical application in Fedderke, Kularatne and Mariotti (2007) . 17 See the discussion in Fedderke, Kularatne and Mariotti (2007) . 18 See Oliviera Martins and Scarpetta (1999) .
This general framework allows the formulation of the PMGE, which allows the intercepts, short-run coe¢ cients and error variances to di¤er freely across groups, but the long-run coe¢ cients to be homogenous; i.e. i = 8 i. Group-speci…c short-run coe¢ cients and the common long-run coe¢ cients are computed by the pooled maximum likelihood estimation. Denoting these estimators by~ i ,~ i ,~ ij ,~ ij and~ , we obtain the PMG estimators by^ PMGE provides an intermediate case between the dynamic …xed e¤ects (DFE) estimator which imposes the homogeneity assumption for all parameters except for the …xed e¤ects, and the mean group estimator (MGE) proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) , which allows for heterogeneity of all parameters. It exploits the statistical power o¤ered by the panel through long-run homogeneity, while still admitting short-run heterogeneity.
The crucial question is whether the assumption of long-run homogeneity is justi…ed, given the threat of ine¢ ciency and inconsistency noted by Pesaran and Smith (1995) . We employ a Hausman (1978) test (hereafter h test) on the di¤erence between MG and PMG estimates of long-run coe¢ cients to test for long run heterogeneity.
19 Note that as long as the homogeneity Hausman test is passed in our estimations, we report only PMG estimation results. 20 Finally, it is worth pointing out that a crucial advantage of the estimation approach of the present paper, is that the dynamics of adjustment in the mark-up are explicitly modelled, while recognizing the presence of a long run equilibrium relationship underlying the dynamics. Thus the justi…cation for the use of the PMG estimator is that it is consistent both with the underlying theory of a homogenous long-run mark-up of price over marginal cost relationship and the possibly heterogeneous dynamic time series nature of the data. As long as sector-homogeneity is assured, the PMGE o¤ers e¢ ciency gains over the MGE, while granting the possibility of dynamic heterogeneity across sectors unlike the DFE estimator. In the presence of long run homogeneity, therefore, our preference is for the use of the PMGE.
The ARDL Approach to Cointegration
Pesaran, Smith (1996, 2001 ) (hereafter PSS) advocate the use of autoregressive distributed lag models for the estimation of long run relations. The PSS bounds testing approach proceeds by estimating the error correction model given by:
Tests of signi…cance of joint zero restrictions on the 0 s of the error correction model establish the presence of a long run relationship, and its directionality. Con…rmation of a unique long run relationship allows for estimation in a two step strategy, selecting the ARDL orders on the basis of the Akaike Information criterion (AIC), then estimating the long and short run coe¢ cients on the basis of the selected model. Estimation of the long run relationship y t = + t + x t + t can be shown to be feasible on the basis of the "Bewley regression:"
by the instrumental variables method, where 1, t,
x t m , serve as instruments,. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Note: Significance level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Errors are clustered at the country level and at the year level for the Sample of "All Countries" and "South Africa" regressions, respectively. 
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